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Chapter 5
China’s Emerging Political and Economic
Dominance in the OSCE Region
Uraimov Marat
Abstract The presence of China in the OSCE region is becoming resilient, partic-
ularly after Beijing began providing infrastructural loans to OSCE states. The size
of the issued infrastructural loans in less developed economies is disproportionate
to national economies, resulting in the borrowing countries becoming incapable of
paying back the loans. In this chapter, I argue that China’s practices of infrastructural
loans and China’s overall standing on minority issues and democratization contra-
dicts the OSCE core principles and undermines OSCE integrity. To illustrate this, I
use, first, the example of the promotion of non-democratic practices through non-
transparent procurement, surveillance of civilians, and supply of police hardware
for suppression and control of political dissidents (based on evidence from Eastern
and Central Europe, and Central Asia) and, for the second example, I illustrate the
violation of minority rights in re-education camps in the Xinjiang region (based
on political and civic reaction from Central Asia), which Chinese authorities call
“Vocational Education andTrainingCenters.” The first example helps to analyze how
Chinese foreign loans contradict the democratic commitments of the borrowing coun-
tries. Chinese infrastructural loans promote non-democratic practices in borrowing
countries throughunfair, non-transparent procurement in infrastructural development
projects. The Chinese side also provides surveillance systems and anti-protest police
vehicles and ammunition which help to undermine individual rights and freedoms.
The second example helps to analyze the reaction of Central AsianMuslim countries
toward China’s treatment of kin-groups, namely the lack of critical reaction of CA
states despite their OSCE-membership and commitment toward promotion of indi-
vidual rights and freedoms (including freedom of faith). China has been providing
infrastructural loans to most OSCE member states over the past two decades; and
these member states have not officially responded to Chinese treatment of their own
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kin-groups, such asKazakh,Kyrgyz, andUyghurminorities—according to theOSCE
core principles on minority rights. The OSCE core principles are categorized under
the “human dimension” to ensure OSCE states’ “respect for individual rights and
fundamental freedoms” and their commitment to “abide by the rule of law; promote
principles of democracy; strengthen and protect democratic institutions” Yamamoto
(2015). Most likely if there were no infrastructural loans from China, the OSCE
countries under analysis would respond to Chinese domestic policy toward ethnic
minorities critically. Most likely, by providing surveillance and police machinery,
China tends to support the existing political regimes in borrowing countries and, by
its non-transparent procurement, it does not encourage enforcement of laws.
Keywords Infrastructural loans ·Minority issues · Democratization · OSCE ·
OSCE-states · OSCE-principles · Non-transparent procurement
5.1 Introduction
China’s emerging political and economic dominance in the OSCE region and its
consequences for development and transformation can be best illustrated by the case
of Chinese infrastructural loans in the region. The reasons and need for these loans
date back to the beginning of the OSCE in the 1990s in the aftermath of the collapse
of communism. In the newly emerged states, an economic and political vacuum
appeared across the Central Asian region. In response, emerging and great powers
sought to increase their influence and presence in the region, through organizations
such as the BRICs and the European Union.
Other organizations such as the OSCE slowly became a player in maintaining
regional security, political transition and democracy, which became a new political
ideology to secure economic development at large. Meanwhile, a political transition
in this regionwas in some statesmore successful, such as in theBaltic states orCentral
Europe, or less a success as in Tajikistan (Foroughi 2010) and post-Yugoslav states
(Woodward 1995) which endured periods of civil war and severe conflict. Econom-
ically, these states faced more difficulties such as hyperinflation and productivity
deficits and looked for any economic and financial opportunity from abroad (Gordon
et al. 2013; Sakwa and Webber 2010). Soon, but not among the first, Chinese loans
and investments gained more and more influence, even before the official launch of
the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since the 1990s, Chinese investment and
enterprises in the OSCE region became resilient, particularly after Beijing began
providing foreign aid and foreign investment to OSCE states in Albania as early
as in the 1950s (in the form of development aid among communist states) and in
Central Asian states since the 1990s (Copper 2016a, b). The size of issued infras-
tructural loans and investments in less developed economies is disproportionate to
their national economies, resulting in the borrowing countries becoming incapable
of paying them back.
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In this chapter, I will illustrate and argue that China’s practices of infrastruc-
tural loans and its contradicting policies conflict with the OSCE core principles and
undermines OSCE integrity in terms of observing individual rights and fundamental
freedoms and rule of law. China, in contrast to Western countries, puts human rights
and democratization issues secondary, because China emphasizes the importance
of and thus gives priority to “securing economic and security interests” along with
“regime survival” (Chen and Kinzelbach 2015).
This is best exemplified by the Chinese promotion of non-democratic practices,
for example, non-transparent procurement, surveillance and police hardware for
suppression and control of political dissidents; and the responses and reactions of
OSCE member states overall in Central Asian states toward re-education camps in
the Xinjiang region that imprison their kin-groups.
Although on the UN level these states oppose Chinese policies in the Xinjiang
region in Northwestern China, the Kazakh andKyrgyz governments did not officially
respond1 to Chinese treatment and human rights violations of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and
Uyghurminorities inChina.One could argue that if therewere no infrastructural loans
and investment policies from China, Central Asian States would respond to Chinese
domestic policy toward ethnicminorities critically.China tends to support the existing
political regimes in borrowing countries and its non-transparent procurement does
not encourage enforcement of laws.
This argument can best be illustrated by benchmarking Chinese domestic poli-
cies toward its national minorities against OSCE and ODIHR core commitments,
mandates, and functions. For example, themandate of theOSCEHighCommissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) has the aim to stress OSCE’s standing as an organi-
zation that stands for minority rights and freedoms, as well as its democratization
efforts. Later, the chapter discusses China’s infrastructural loans (major projects)
in the OSCE states and argues for China’s promotion of non-democratic practices
in the OSCE region, namely it discusses promotion of non-transparency, supply of
surveillance and police hardware for suppression and control of political dissidents in
less developed OSCE member states. The final part examines re-education camps in
Xinjiang and the reaction of the OSCE participating states receiving Chinese funds,
in particular the Kyrgyz and Kazakh governments.
5.2 China’s Economic Policies
China has become one of the world’s most rapidly growing economies over the
last 40 years thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s unprecedented economic reforms of 1979.
Since 2010 after surpassing Japan, it has been the world’s second largest economy
1 They officially responded that this matter is Chinese domestic policy and Chinese domestic affairs
to which they cannot interfere. In other words, the Chinese action has been approved despite it
breached OSCE and other international norms on minority treatment.
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in terms of real gross domestic product just behind the United States. It was only in
the mid-1970s when Beijing launched its “open door” policies. In 1982 the country
adopted an “independent foreign policy” framework (Lijun 1994). With the aim of
opening China to the world, China initially launched so-called “special economic
zones.” These economic zones were designed to support the export of Chinese goods
following Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on development of foreign economic relations
and the Politburo’s third plenum meeting decision in 1978 (Ibid.). Initially, four
economic zones were established in 1979, but later in 1984, given the successful
experience with existing economic zones performance, the Politburo approved the
status of “special economic zones” in fourteen other seaside cities and the island of
Hainan (Barnett 1985).
According to Garver (2016), the Chinese economic rise that took root after the
“open door policies” consists of two major steps: (1) promotion of export and (2)
import of technology. The author continues, noting that China imported technology
with the profits it gained from exports (Ibid.). Imported technology was utilized to
improve the competitiveness of Chinese products, including technology. However,
from 2005 a new task was set up, according to which China was not targeting the
import of new technology, but rather making an effort to “turn the PRC into a global
leader in technological innovation” by 2050 (Garver 2016, p. 699). According to this
plan, China aims to become a world “center” of technology and innovation.
Despite a long year history of Chinese aid, there is no agreement on how to
properly define it. Although China officially declares its foreign aid and/or foreign
investment as “South-South cooperation” in the White Papers issued in 2011 and
2014, and in other official publications, China avoids using certain terms for its
financing (Carter 2017, p. 2). TheWhitePaper only presents fiveprinciples ofChinese
financing for how to deliver aid (State Council 2011, 2014). The White Paper does
not differentiate between types of existing financing instruments, but prefers to list
“grants (aid gratis), interest-free loans and concessional loans,” and eight forms
of aid known as “complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation,
human resource development cooperation, medical teams sent abroad, emergency
humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries, and debt relief” under the
category of “Chinese financial aid flows” (State Council 2011).
China’s format of aid is different too. Bräutigam, for example, notes that China
does not provide financing to other countries in cash, despite emergency situations
(Bräutigam 2009). She also notes that Chinese financing is usually “delivered in
kind, as exports of Chinese goods and services” (Ibid., p. 125). Others stress the
“government-to-government” model that leads the Beijing-way of investing (Carter
2017, p. 2; Poskitt et al. 2016, p. 5). However, this model gives little room for
other non-state or private actors to be part of the negotiation processes (Bräutigam
2009; Copper 2016a, c; Tian 2018). In addition to the lack of agreement on Chinese
foreign investment, Bräutigam argued that China’s aid programs lack transparency
and therefore create uncertainty (2011).
Finally, China tends to support non-democratic governments that show a high
level of corruption (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Dave 2018; Tian 2018;
Toktomushev 2018), for example in Tajikistan or Turkmenistan.
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Against this backdrop, one can conclude that China is pragmatic and considers
merely economic incentives vis-à-vis governments, therefore it is not concerned
about partnering with undemocratic systems. On the other hand, Chinese loans are
attractive for most developing countries or countries under crisis because China
does not ask for a political conditionality in exchange, let alone any positive human
rights record. Loans and grants of the World Bank, European Union or US financial
institutions, in contrast with the Chinese government, are accompanied with condi-
tions related to economic reforms, democratic governance, observance of human
rights and freedoms, transparency, etc., making financing access difficult to less-
democratic regimes (Copper 2016c). Copper (2016c), in his book “China’s Foreign
Aid and Investment Diplomacy,” wrote: “Western aid, including US Foreign assis-
tance is also said to be “tied” to efforts to promote democracy and human rights,
which makes it less effective in promoting development and thus less attractive to
African leaders.” (p. 82).
Therefore, there is a tendency for less democratic developing countries to prefer
contracting with Chinese rather than other investment giants, which impose their
own conditionality such as rule of law-based compliance and requirements, as well
increasing the transparencyof investments and level of accountability.Chinaobserves
non-intervention principles into the internal affairs of investment-recipient countries
and allows them to choose own development model (Tian 2018).
This makes China a flexible investor in comparison with the western investors
that put forward many conditionalities. For example, since 1960 China has invested
in African countries dominated by patronage politics, such as Zimbabwe, Sudan,
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia in Africa and Myanmar, Burma and
Cambodia in Asia (Copper 2016b, c), whereas western investors do not risk investing
in volatile unstable countries (Kazianis 2011). Finally, China tends to solve domestic
problems through providing foreign investment. For example, China provides foreign
investment to Muslim countries like Indonesia because it “proved an effective tool”
(Copper 2016b, p. 2) to build diplomatic relations and polish its bad reputation vis-
à-vis Muslim countries and hence to resolve its own “Islamic problem at home and
with countries of the Middle East.” (Ibid.)
Less democratic states within the OSCE region and with weak state institutions
are also primary aid receivers from Beijing. These regimes risk managing aid in non-
transparent and unaccountable ways, resulting in debts. Beijing’s loans are ostensibly
opaque and troublesome to weak states and put these countries in over-debt and
dependent on China. For instance, in 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s external debt to China
reached 1,774 million USD, while the country’s budget is 163 billion Kyrgyz soms.2
Thus, China remains a leading loan-owner for Kyrgyzstan. According to the report
issued in 2018 by the Center for Global Development, Kyrgyzstan is listed among
2 Ministry of Finance of Kyrgyz Republic. 2018. “Struktura gosudarstvennogo vnexnego
dolga KR po sostoni na 31.05.2020 goda—Novosti vedomstva—Ministerstvo
finansov Kyrgyzsko Respubliki.” (The structure of the state external debt of




eight states which are overly indebted to China and could suffer from debt distress.
The report states: “We find that of the 23 countries identified above, there are 10–15
that could suffer from debt distress due to future BRI-related financing, with eight
countries of particular concern. These countries are Djibouti, the Kyrgyz Republic
(Kyrgyzstan), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), the Maldives, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.” (Hurley et al. 2018, p. 11).
Four Central Asian OSCE member states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro,
andMongolia) are highly indebted due to the disproportionate size of loans compared
to the countries’ GDP. China’s resulting economic policies pose many challenges.
For instance, Tajikistan was already unable to pay back a Chinese loan in 2011 and
was forced to cede 980 km2 to Beijing (Karrar and Mostowlansky 2020) and in
2019 the Tajik government was criticized for leasing Tajik land to a Chinese mining
company.3 In 2020, as the Kyrgyz government was not able to service its debt to
China, they attempted several times to request Beijing to reschedule and restructure
the debt, but China kept silent in response. The Kyrgyz government sought help from
the population and launched a money collection campaign to return the debt.4
As a consequence, China is often depicted both as a peaceful power and as a
“threat” or “neo-colonial” power, and authors like Yahuda note that Chinese leaders
endeavor to deny the political consequences of economic relations (Yahuda 1997).
Whereas others, such as Heilmann and Schmidt, note that China has increasing geo-
political aspirations by highlighting that “Chinese leaders have decided to play a
larger role in shaping international mechanisms through the G20, becoming a “rule
maker” rather than a “rule taker” when it comes to such things as regulating financial
markets, stabilizing the international monetary system, and preventing protectionist
practices” (2014, p. 27).
On the local level, for example, in relations between the South-East Asian
Economic Association (ASEAN) and China, there are complaints about unfair trade
relations. For example, Indonesian and Thai producers claim that their markets are
flooded by Chinese goods, while Malays worry that China’s increasing influence
might turn into a threat (Ibid.). This bias in trade relationships will not easily be
resolved despite the 2020 agreement on a trade union between China and ASEAN.5
Similar tensions occurred between China and Central Asian states in response to
the inflow of Chinese workers into construction works and an anxious labor market.
For instance, in Tajikistan, a non-experienced Chinese firm took construction of
the Dushanbe–Khujand–Chanak highway in 2010 despite there being local compa-
nies with good experience (see Pantucci and Lain 2017). For example, in 2017
3 Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. “Silver Lining? Tajikistan Defends Controversial Deci-
sion To Give Mine To China.” Accessed at https://www.rferl.org/a/silver-lining-tajikistan-defends-
controversial-decision-to-give-mine-to-china/30199786.html.
4 Radio Azattyk. 2021. “ºkm8t bdet tolturuuda lden ardam surat.” (Radio
Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2021 The government is asking its population for help with budget
shortfalls) Accessed at https://www.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-budget-help/31036352.html.
5 VOA News. 2020. Trade Deal Raises Questions About China’s Dominance. Accessed at https://
www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/trade-deal-raises-questions-about-chinas-dominance.
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in Kyrgyzstan,6 and in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015 and in 2018 in Kazakhstan,7
Chinese labor in localmarkets led to public dissatisfaction and even resulted in violent
conflicts between Chinese workers and local residents. Later in 2019, so-called “Chi-
nese expansionism” was blamed during public protests that gathered more than 300
people in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan8 and which continued in 2020. In Kaza-
khstan, the protestors were demanding transparency when dealing with China, while
in Pakistan9 and in Kyrgyzstan10 rallies were held against depleting natural resources
being exploited by China.
Depending on the recipient country’s economic and resource capacity, China
pursues either political or economic benefits, or even both. However, this is not to
say that trade and commerce are more important for China than its political interests
or vice versa. Many scholars note that China has been successful in applying its
economic strength by providing aid and loans to accomplish its foreign policy objec-
tives. Among its successes cited is recognition of the One China policy and political
support in international arenas for China’s game-changing behavior on different
agendas, including human rights. Today, Chinese infrastructural loans are issued to
Chinese partner states—along with its political conditionality—in search of natural
resources, enhancing trade connections and establishing new market zones.
5.3 Chinese Investments in the OSCE Region
Chinese investment interests in the OSCE region have matured since the 1990s
after the initiation of the so-called second phase of “foreign investment” in the 1980s
with pragmatic considerations promoting trade and commerce (Copper 2016a).More
precisely, Chinese foreign investment into and infrastructural loans to other countries,
with its economic and political gains, have been provided after 1978 when Deng
6 RadioAzattyk. 2013. “Massova draka vKurxabe.FOTO.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty. 2013 Mass fight in Kurshab. Photo.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_kurs
hab_mass_brawl/24819123.
7 KARAVAN Media Portal. 2018. “Protivostonie kazahstancev i kitacev: v
qem priqina konfliktov, proishodwih na kitaskih neftnyh predpritih.”
(KaravanMedia Portal. 2018. Opposition of Kazakhs and Chinese. What causes conflicts occurring
in Chinese oil enterprises.) Accessed at https://www.caravan.kz/news/protivostoyanie-kazakhsta
ncev-i-kitajjcev-v-chem-prichina-konfliktov-proiskhodyashhikh-na-kitajjskikh-neftyanykh-predpr
iyatiyakh-423556/.
8 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “Qem moet obernuts dl Kyrgyzstana usilenie
antikitaskih nastroeni?” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty) Accessed at https://rus.
azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_china_politics/29703213.html.
9 Nikkei Asian Review. 2018. “Pakistan struggles to contain rise of anti-China sentiment.”
Accessed at https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Pakistan-struggles-to-contain-rise-
of-anti-China-sentiment.
10 Radio Azattyk. 2018. “V Kadamae naqalos rassledovanie po faktu uderani
kitaskih predprinimatele v kontenere.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty) Accessed
at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/29513370.html.
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Xiaoping resumed power as head of the Chinese communist party and government.
Under his unprecedented economic reforms, China has embarked on a free-market
capitalist economy path which boosted the country’s economic growth by opening
its doors to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and international trade. As a result, the
Chinese ability to sustain high savings and low consumption rates could increase the
Chinese potential of giving and offering infrastructural loans, mostly in a manner of
traditional “tribute diplomacy,” especially when it comes to small developing states
with minor geopolitical significance.
Due to the unequal economic development of OSCE region since the early 1990s,
the former post-Soviet as well as Balkan states are most vulnerable to Chinese attrac-
tive infrastructural loans, despite development and investments efforts have been
carried out by other stakeholders such as the European Union (Pavlićević 2019).
These countries have been destinations for Chinese FDI, in particular after and
during global financial crisis of 2008. For instance, there are more than 1600 “green”
Chinese enterprises in the EU countries of South East and Eastern Europe, which
employ more than 50 thousand local workers (Szunomár and Biedermann 2014).
However, it should be noted that Chinese state-owned enterprises are also perceived
as a subject for “political guidance directly from the Communist Party,” because
around 72% of Chinese investments in Europe came from state-owned enterprises.
Meanwhile, engagement of the Chinese private investor sector is low (Ibid., p. 24).
Since 2013, the BRI project has been the most discussed investment project in the
OSCE region. It aims to connect countries and regions with China through its land
and sea routes and crosses the entire region via pipelines, railroads, roads, and air.11
Millions of Chinese cargo containers cross the region every year by land and sea
routes,12 for instance, through newly-built railroad going from China through Kaza-
khstan the number of cargo containers have increased from 2,000 containers in 2011
to 42,000 containers in 201513 in this Eurasia region, China had begun to provide
infrastructural loans much earlier than when it announced the BRI. It is important to
note that through the BRI, China contributes to the promotion connectivity benefiting
economic growth and development of OSCE member states by increasing the flow
of trade and investment and by developing and maintaining transport infrastructure
(Wolff 2018). According to two White Papers that were issued in 2011 and 2014
by the Chinese government, the policies intend to connect infrastructure of coun-
tries under the BRI to enable buying and selling, to promote open markets, enhance
and build joint financial markets with China, and to reinforce “people-to-people”
11 Mercator Institute for China Studies. 2018. Mapping the Belt and Road Initiative: this is where
we stand. Accessed at https://merics.org/en/analysis/mapping-belt-and-road-initiative-where-we-
stand.
12 Freight Waves. 2019. Port Report: China’s massive growth in ocean box shipping and over-
the-road trucking. Accessed at https://www.freightwaves.com/news/port-report-chinas-massive-
growth-in-ocean-box-shipping-and-over-the-road-trucking.
13 Forbes. 2016. Why The China-Europe ‘Silk Road’ Rail Network Is Growing Fast. Accessed
at https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/01/28/why-china-europe-silk-road-rail-transp
ort-is-growing-fast/?sh=2557054659ae.
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contacts.14 China is largely investing in the improvement and construction of trans-
port infrastructure connecting Beijing with the west and the rest of the world. In
this context, the OSCE member states in Central Asia and East-Central Europe have
become transit corridors for Chinese commodities, as have Kazakhstan, Serbia and
Poland, on the way to the western parts of Europe, including to Germany, Italy and
France.
5.4 OSCE Policies on National Minorities
and Democratization
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) are the two main structures
within OSCE along with others which work to ensure and to promote minority rights
and democratization in the OSCE region. Their norms and standards in transparency,
accountability and participation, and their overall respect for minority and human
rights in the OSCE region often have been hindered by foreign investments and
policies of third countries, such as China, (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Dave
2018; Tian 2018). HCNM and ODIHR run their offices and programs throughout
the OSCE region, with intense activities, in particular in post-Communist states in
Eurasia. Post-Communist OSCEmember states are described asweaker democracies
and economies and yet with a number of ethnic, linguistic and religious minority
groups issues concerning OSCE’s two main structures (Dave 2018; Tian 2018).
The recent report issued by a democracy measurement project at the University
of Gothenburg in Sweden, the V-Dem research project, overall demonstrates that
democratic backsliding in the region is worryingly occurring broadly in post-Soviet
countries (see Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). This backsliding opens the doors to
non-transparent, opaque and “governments only” agreement between China and its
counterparts (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Tian 2018). Yet, OSCEminority,
democratization, and human rights policies programs are aimed at avoiding exactly
this, namely that the governments were transparent and less able to make economic
or trade agreements behind closed doors without including other actors or groups
that are affected by it in the negotiation process (Mihr 2020).
Back in July 1992, as a response to inter-ethnic tensions after the fall of commu-
nism and the collapse of the Soviet Union which led to the establishment of many
new republics that are today the main target of Chinese investments, the Helsinki
Summit decided to establish the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
due to the alarming rise of violence and discrimination against ethnic, linguistic
and religious minorities in the OSCE region. HCNM has ever since developed an
alerting and conflict prevention mechanism, and according to its mandate the High
Commissioners’ office in TheHague carries out “‘early warning’ and, as appropriate,
14 Mercator Institute forChinaStudies. 2018. “Mapping theBelt andRoad initiative: this iswherewe
stand.” Accessed at https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker/mapping-the-belt-and-road-initiative.
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‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national
minority issues” (Diacofotakis 2002). HCNM works independently, in a confiden-
tial manner and applies a “quiet diplomacy” approach. The High Commissioner
undertakes regular visits to the OSCE member states to assess national minorities’
situation and provides recommendations to governments to improve inter-ethnic
relations. According to key principles and guidelines adopted since 1996,15 and to
the ODIHR’s activities such as human rights monitoring, OSCE participating states
commit themselves to observe and promote minority rights, individual rights and
freedoms, rule of law and democratic values in general.
However, since China began its financial intervention, these values among OSCE
participating states increasingly became of little importance, at least because of their
financial dependence, if not because of the fear of losing a “sponsor.” In particular,
tender procedures of the OSCE states are undermined because the Chinese side inter-
venes into domestic procurement regulations, for example, resulting in a breach of
rule of law in theOSCE region.Chinese surveillance equipment andpolicemachinery
received by some OSCE member states such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan, as part of unspecified bilateral agreement, are used to monitor and
suppress opposition protests, breaching OSCE core principles of individual rights
and freedoms. Finally, the Kyrgyz and the Kazakh governments did not, so far, offi-
cially respond to Chinese treatment of their kin-groups in Xinjiang, even after the
launch of international reports in 2017 that illustrated the breach of minority rights,
individual rights and freedoms in the North-Western Chinese province. According
to human rights watch report (2018), “Xinjiang’s domestic policy16 has also had
implications abroad. […] targeting people with connections to an official list of “26
sensitive countries”, includingKazakhstan,Malaysia […]” (p. 4). These countries are
characterized as “the governments [having] close relationship with Beijing” (p. 5).
For instance, Kazakhstan preferred “developing good relations with China” to “sup-
porting ethnically and culturally close Uyghur population in Xinjiang” (Burkhanov
2018, p. 154). Based on it, “the Chinese government has stepped up pressure on
other governments to forcibly return Uyghurs in their countries to China” (p. 4).
It might indicate that Chinese partner-countries are not only in solidarity with each
other regarding the Chinese principle of non-interference but also “supports Beijing’s
fundamental diplomatic and political stances prior to receiving any funding” (Tian
15 HCNM core documents are: The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights
of National Minorities and Explanatory Note (1996), The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the
Linguistic Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory Note (1998), The Lund Recommenda-
tions on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life and Explanatory Note
(1999), Guidelines on the use of Minority Languages in the Broadcast Media and Explanatory Note
(2003), Recommendations on Policing inMulti-Ethnic Societies and Explanatory Note (2006), The
Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations and Explanatory
Note (2008), The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies and Explanatory Note
(2012).
16 Beijing introduced specific policy “StrikeHardCampaign against Violent Terrorism” inXinjiang,
a tool used by local governments to effectively fight crime, that have been “highlighted the abusive
nature of these drives” leading “to numerous arbitrary arrests and summary executions” (Human
Rights Watch 2018, p. 12).
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2018, p. 26). Hence, one can correlate that the financial dependence to China of some
member states is challenging the integrity of OSCE principles as outline by HCNM
and ODIHR.
5.5 Non-transparent Policies in OSCE Region
Not long after China announced the BRI in 2013, its investment and loan poli-
cies became key world financing strategies. As stated earlier, Chinas is providing
foreign aid, loans and infrastructure investments to developing countries, including
the OSCE region. Central Asian Countries, as well as countries in Western Balkan
or Belarus, are key target countries for Chinese investments and loans.17 However,
it is important to note that these states might receive infrastructural loans and invest-
ments under different conditions because there are not yet any single loan issuing
regulations introduced by Beijing to manage its capital (Copper 2016a; Dave 2018).
It is likely that China is applying multifarious approaches in designing its capital
to look unique and different from traditional donors and creditors (Ibid.). As prac-
tices of financing infrastructure projects demonstrate, Beijing is using its economic
strength for attaining its long- and short-term goals. In other words, the way China
provides investment and infrastructural loans is designed not only to manipulate but
also to outmaneuver established international and regional rules and norms (Ibid.).
Chinese investments and infrastructural loans tend to support non-democratic prac-
tices (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a, b, c; Dave 2018; Toktomushev 2018). One can
speak in turn about non-transparent procurement by Chinese companies and Chinese
goods, Chinese support of surveillance and provision of police equipment which is
used by the incumbent regimes to repress and control political dissidents (Cave et al.
2019; Dave 2018; Tian 2018).
First, Chinese investments and infrastructural loans in theOSCE region are accom-
panied by Chinese goods and products, Chinese labor forces and workers (See Laru-
elle 2018). It is argued that infrastructural projects rely on Chinese companies and
Chinese labor to guarantee efficient investment given that underdeveloped coun-
tries where China bankrolls projects can be lacking in professionals with required
technical skills. However, the Chinese “guaranteed contract” approach promotes
non-transparency and violates domestic procurement policies, which contradicts the
17 According to China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT), Kyrgyzstan between 2013 and 2020
has received in total USD 4.34 billion foreign investment and construction finances. Because the
amount cited by CGIT is larger than the total debt of Kyrgyzstan to China, these numbers might
include other unspecified foreign aid, including police machinery and ammunitions. Tajikistan,
in contrast to Kyrgyzstan, received its biggest share of loans during the pre-BRI period. Tajik
total foreign investment between 2013 and 2020 amounted to USD 540 million which is 25% of
the total numbers Tajikistan received since 2005. With regards to Belarus, CGIT reports that the
country received in total USD 6.03 billion from 2005 to 2020. Similar to Tajikistan, the largest share
(around 70%) Minsk received comes to the pre-BRI period.
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OSCE’s rule of law and anti-corruption commitments. China’s way of doing invest-
ment in OSCEmember countries contributes to anti-democratic and non-transparent
practices. In the OSCE participating states discussed below, China is both an investor
and contractor with a potential winning position that questions its transparency.
In 2015, Hungary—which is facing a serious investigation by the European
Commission for its breach of rule of law and high level of corruption—was the first
European country that welcomed China’s BRI under which a 350 km railway road
between Budapest and Belgrade in Serbia was planned. The Budapest and Belgrade
railway connection was planned to be invested in by China and partially by Hungary.
The non-transparent procurement process for the Chinese investment to construct a
high-speed railway connection between Budapest and Belgrade resulted in serious
discussions among the EU administration and western countries. The 166 km section
in Hungary on the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed railway, which has an estimated
value of USD 2.9 billion, became a procurement scandal case in 2017, according
to the Warsaw Institute (2019), because it breached the EU procurement procedures
as no public and transparent tender was announced. The Chinese company took a
“guaranteed contract” and was considered as a preferred contractor to construct the
railway in 2020. The EU’s accusation of a non-transparent procurement by Hungary
resulted in a special investigation commission by the EU to check the issue of the
EU’s internal procurement regulations breach (Ibid.).
In a similar way, in other Eastern and Central European states, China again
promoted non-transparent procurement. InMontenegro, although not an EUmember
state, China used its own company to construct a road to connect Bar port with Serbia
with an e800 million loan from the Exim Bank of China.18 Whereas in Macedonia
China had invested and launched the construction of a 57 km road connection with a
e373 million loan from Exim Bank of China by the state-owned Chinese Sinohydro
company, the project was later stopped by the Ministry of Transport and Communi-
cation due to incompliance that disadvantaged the state budget for a sum of e155
million.19
The EU’s concerns about Chinese engagement within EU member states, as well
as in its neighboring states—of whichmany seek long-termmembership in the EU—
as the investor and contractor in 16 + 1 states, are legitimate. Chinese investment
practices violate both domestic and EU procurement rules and procedures, according
to which these practices are evaluated as non-transparent and non-competitive.
Unlike Eastern Europe, Central Asian states are even more vulnerable to Chinese
non-democratic practices because they are not EU members nor under EU member-
ship consideration. Therefore in these countries, EU norms and standards concerning
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms are not under consideration when it
comes to receiving infrastructural loans, let alone negotiation of respective issues
between the governments of borrower and loan issuer (see Laruelle 2018). For
18 Reuters. 2014. “Montenegro, China’s Exim Bank agree $1 billion highway deal.” Accessed at
https://www.reuters.com/article/montenegro-highway-idUSL5N0SP4BI20141030.
19 Balkan Insight. 2017. “Poor Planning Halts Macedonia Highway Projects.” Accessed at https://
balkaninsight.com/2017/06/20/poor-planning-halts-macedonia-s-highway-projects-06-20-2017/.
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example, Kyrgyzstan’s procurement in favor of a Chinese company in 2017 became a
true nightmare while modernizing its largest heating plant.20 The Chinese company,
the Tebian Electric Apparatus company (TBEA), rehabilitated and equipped “TEC
Bishkek” underChinese infrastructural loans in 2017.21 However, the heat plant expe-
rienced an accident (leakage) right after its renovation.22 Local popular grievances
after the accident resulted in serious investigations and imprisonments of high-rank
state officialswith corruption charges.23 Aswas later revealed, theChinese contractor
of the “TECBishkek” never provided the Kyrgyz government with a detailed budget.
Prices in the budget were unrealistically increased.24 The Kyrgyz side seemed to
be aware only about a total amount of budget without its per-item prices. The
notorious Chinese TBEA company was also a contractor to construct the Datka-
Kemin electricity transmission line project in June 2012 in Kyrgyzstan.25 Under the
Datka-Kemin electricity transmission line project, two objects were constructed: (1)
a national power transmission line from Datka to Kemin and (2) a substation in
Kemin. The total cost of the project was evaluated at 389.74 million USD.26 Despite
the project being successfully accomplished in 2015, in 2018 it was discovered
that the budget was groundlessly increased against market prices.27 With the rise of
BRI, Kyrgyzstan is anticipating a number of BRI-related infrastructure project loans
supplied by the Chinese EXIM Bank. These include several hydropower plants, a
railway connecting China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, a number of road construc-
tions, and the finalization of Central Asia–China gas pipeline, during the imple-
mentation of which non-transparent procurement in favor of China is most likely to
occur.
In the same way, when constructing highways in Kyrgyzstan with Chinese infras-
tructural loans, only Chinese labor was used despite the local labor surplus.28 Exclu-
sively Chinese companies were involved in construction activities using exclusively
Chinese labor and recruiting only a modicum of local labor—mainly for administra-
tive and translation purposes (Garibov 2018; Jaborov 2018). During the construction
of the Bishkek–Naryn–Torugart corridor, Chinese labor prevailed over local (Dirk
van der Kley 2020). Of note is that Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan
20 The New York Times. 2019. A Power Plant Fiasco Highlights China’s Growing Clout in Central






25 AzattykYnalgysy. 2018. “Datka-Kemin kinqi	Bbolobu?” (Radio Free Europe,




28 Radio Azattyk. 2015. “V Kyrgyzstane 70% immigrantov—gradane iz Kita.”
(Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 70% of immigrants in Kyrgyzstan—citizens of China) Accessed
20 September 2020. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/26936205.html.
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by February 2017made up 594 thousand people,29 clearly demonstrating the internal
labor surplus in Kyrgyzstan. This practice does not bring in any social capital devel-
opment or contribution to the well-being of communities along the BRI.30 According
to some, China needs to employ its workers abroad in order to affect the unemploy-
ment situation in China, which has been a problem for Chinese leaders as it could
“engender social and political instability” (Copper 2016b, p. 120). However, one
of the main reasons behind the usage of Chinese labor forces and workers, as well
as using only Chinese products in infrastructure projects abroad (Copper 2016a, c;
Jaborov 2018), including the artificial increase of market prices, as the case of TEC
Bishkek31 confirmed, is because Beijing tries to significantly save on its expenses
(see Laruelle 2018). In other words, much of the capital is returned back to China,
minimizing its risk of investment returns (Ibid.). Taking this into consideration, it
might be true that China stands in a winning position.
Second, along with Chinese infrastructural loans, OSCEmember states in Central
Asia received security-related equipment32 and support in an effort tomaintain agree-
ments with the countries’ leaders on infrastructural loans with Beijing’s relative
winning terms and position unquestioned. China’s achievement of relative gains with
weak governments can be explained by recipient country leaders’ personal interests
throughout the whole process of loan agreements (Bräutigam 2009; Copper 2016a,
c; Tian 2018; Toktomushev 2018). Since the terms and conditions of infrastructural
loans are kept secret and could be known only to the leaders of recipient countries
(Ibid.), incumbent leaders appear to be convenient for China to cooperate with until
loan-related interests and goals are no longer being attained (Ibid.). For instance, a
bilateral infrastructural loan contract between China and Malaysia signed in 2016
was recently questioned byMahathirMohamad, the newPrimeMinister ofMalaysia,
after an assessment of the loan contract signed by his predecessor Najib Razak found
that the terms of the deal were not favorable to Malaysia.33
As a result of raising and uncovering unknown details of a “secret” project, China
had to reconsider and had no other choice than to give concessions.34 To avoid
29 Rossiskisovetpomedunarodnymdelam (RSMD),AnalitikiiKommentarii.
2017. “Kyrgyzstan vEA	S:rezultatyuqasti.Qast vtora.” (The Russian Council
on Foreign Affairs (RSMD), Analysts and Comments. “Kyrgyzstan in the EAEU: participa-
tion results. Part two.”) Accessed at https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/columns/eur
asian-economy/kyrgyzstan-v-eaes-rezultaty-uchastiya-chast-vtoraya/?sphrase_id=1721103.
30 BBC News. 2017. “China’s secret aid empire uncovered.” Accessed at https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-41564841.
31 The New York Times. 2019. A Power Plant Fiasco Highlights China’s Growing Clout in Central
Asia. Accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/06/world/asia/china-russia-central-asia.html.
32 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “Kita peredal Kyrgyzstanu policesku tehniku na
milliony dollarov.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. Shina donated millions of
dollars worth of police equipment and machines to Kyrgyzstan.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyq.
org/a/29978604.html.
33 The Diplomat. 2019. Malaysia: Revised China Deal Shows Costs Were Inflated. Accessed at
https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/malaysia-revised-china-deal-shows-costs-were-inflated/.
34 Ibid.
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similar situations, China tends to support regimes in power by providing surveil-
lance and police equipment. China believes that weak governments are interested in
preserving their power through suppression of anti-government protests, as well as
using administrative resources or even sometimes through manipulation of voting
results in elections which raise OSCE concerns.
For instance, the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have recently signed contracts with Chinese surveillance companies
on the installation of high-technology cameras in the streets of the main cities.35
Huawei, China’s controversial telecommunication giant, is also engaged in surveil-
lance projects of the region, which are being accused by the West of using 5G tech-
nology for cyber espionage. Social activists and citizens of the region are against
street video monitoring system with facial recognition technology as it poses risks to
private data and human rights, and as it is unclear whether a foreign country (China)
has access to data collection and processing. Additionally, China’s involvement in
this regard is associated with its surveillance system over its Muslim population in
the Xinjiang region where scandalous “re-education camps” are built to forcefully
detain and re-educate Muslims against their will and without trial. In particular, in
politically unstable Kyrgyzstan which experienced its third coup-d’état since inde-
pendence and which has a vibrant opposition, Chinese water cannons were used by
the police to suppress opposition-led protests in 2020 in Bishkek in support of pres-
idential candidate Sadyr Japarov.36 It is important to note that similar police equip-
ment was not used for peaceful protests. For instance, in June 2020 and December
2019 during Bishkek protests organized by civil society groups and labelled as
“Reakci,” “REakci 2.0,”37 and “REakci 3.0” (“Reaction,” “Reaction 2.0,”
“Reaction 3.0”),38 called for the now ex-president Sooronbai Jeenbekov to offer a
“reaction” toward Azattyk journalists’ investigation into corruption in the customs
system, and for Jeenbekov’s reaction to a draft law on information manipulation. By
providing surveillance and police machinery made in China, China tends to support
the existing political regimes of partner-countries they invest in, by enhancingmerely
its domestic development policies, particularly those efforts to reduce local unem-
ployment and enhanced domestic stability in mind (Copper 2016a, c; Jaborov 2018;
35 Eurasianet. 2019. “China Taking Big Brother to Central Asia: China is exporting its model of
invasive, all-encompassing surveillance to Central Asia.” Accessed at https://eurasianet.org/china-
taking-big-brother-to-central-asia.
36 Kloop blog. 2020. “Miting v podderku aparova zaverxils razgonom, est
zaderannye.” (The rally in support of Japarov ended in dispersal, there are some detainees)
Accessed at https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/03/02/live-miting-storonnikov-zhaparova-v-bishkeke/.
37 Radio Azattyk. 2020. “Reakci 2.0:V Bixkeke proxla akci protiv korrupcii i
cenzury.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2020. Reaction 2.0: Action against corruption and
censorship was held in Bishkek) Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30331476.html.
38 Radio Azattyk. 2020. “Reakci 2.0: V Bixkeke proxla akci protiv
zakonoproekta «O manipulirovanii informacie.» (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty.
2020. Reaction 2.0: In Bishkek, action was held against the bill “On information manipulation.”)
Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30696065.html.
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Tian 2018). Development in third countries serves primarily China’s domestic inter-
ests (Ibid.). Chinese non-transparent procurement does not encourage enforcement
of laws.
China remains a leading loan-owner to Central Asian states. This broadly means
that the countries indebted to China have to act in accordance with Chinese interests
and to share China’s standing on democracy and sensitive issues, such as minority
and human rights. As I discuss in the following section of the chapter, two Central
Asian states—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—kept silent toward Chinese inhumane
treatment of their kin-groups, the ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in Chinese detention
camps (Human Rights Watch 2018), despite strong local civic displeasure toward
re-educational camps and treatment of ethnic kin in China.
5.6 Re-educational Camps in Xinjiang and Reactions
With a population of 22million, theXinjiangUyghurAutonomousRegion (XUAR)39
of China is located in the western part of the PRC, and here a TurkicMuslimminority
make up the largest percent of the population (around 60%) of the region, which
includes Uyghurs, the largest linguistic, ethnic and religious minority, and ethnic
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who share common culture, religion and the Turkic language.
This part of China is less developed with its poor infrastructure and depressed socio-
economic life in comparison to the fast-developing Chinese East. The presence of
ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz in the territory of present-day China is due to those
groups fleeing from their homeland during the Central Asian mass revolt of 1916—
also known as “Urkun”—against the expansion of the Russian Empire.40 After Xi
Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, the minority issues related not only to Muslims, but
also to other non-Muslim groups, became increasingly questioned by the Chinese
authorities (Human Rights Watch 2018). Their cultural and religious freedoms, for
example, to learn and speak their native language and exercise their religion, had
worsened, with minorities increasingly became suppressed and monitored (Ibid.).
International reports and evidence of re-education camps and facilities had
appeared already by 2016 after Chen Quanguo, the new governor of Xinjiang,
was appointed as a chief Communist Party Secretary of the region (Ibid.). These
39 The locals in particular Muslims name the region as East Turkistan (Uyghuristan).
40 International Institute for Asian. 2016. “The Time of Ordeal: a story of the 1916 revolt in Central
Asia.” Accessed at https://www.iias.asia/the-newsletter/article/time-ordeal-story-1916-revolt-cen
tral-asia.
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camps are a legacy of “the cultural revolution” which took place from 1966 to 1976
in China, during which millions of political opponents, dissidents, and minorities
were imprisoned, tortured, executed, enslaved, and “reeducated” in camps (Hauling
2005; Human Rights Watch 2018; Zainab 2019). Some western officials charac-
terize Chinese re-education camps as “modern-day slavery camps,”41 because the
imprisoned people are forced to work without payment.42 Since 2016 many Chinese
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz have begun disappearing or have been later found
detained in the political education camps (Ibid.). Relatives and friends living abroad,
concerned about their disappearance have raised the alarm and made known to
the public the existence of political education camps in Xinjiang which purpose-
fully targeted the Muslim population in the region. Chinese officials have explained
its extraordinary policy measures as necessary for combatting increasing religious
extremism of Xinjiang’s Muslim population. However, Chinese officials’ explana-
tion justifies these camps, but cannot clarify the legality of their actions after it was
revealed that China was hiding the process of re-educating Chinese Muslims. Accu-
sations against the Chinese government have been made not only by international
human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, which have mentioned
“mass arbitrary detention, torture and mistreatment” (Human Rights Watch 2018,
p. 111) of the Turkic population of the Muslim faith in Xinjiang and their family
members but also during protests against Chinese authorities in cities inKyrgyzstan43
andKazakhstan,44 where the protesterswho showed solidaritywith their kin inChina,
who were imprisoned and deported by their police forces. For example, in 2017,
several residents of Bishkek have publicly addressed the Kyrgyz government and the
President to assist in releasing detained relatives and friends in Xinjiang camps from
the Chinese KizilSu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture (KKAP), who after returning
to KKAP disappeared,45 despite possession of Kyrgyz citizenship. A Chinese ethnic
Kyrgyz who has been living in Kyrgyzstan for a long time was detained in China by
forcing his relatives to call him and ask him to travel back to KKAP if he wants his
relatives to be released. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan
did not react to the Kyrgyz citizen’s illegal imprisonment owing to the Chinese
counterpart reasoning that the Chinese ethnic Kyrgyz did not renounce his Chinese
41 BBC News. 2020. “Xinjiang: China defends ‘education’ camps.” Accessed at https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-asia-china-54195325.
42 Democracy Now. 2020. “Modern-Day Slavery”: China Is Forcing Muslims into Forced Labor,
Prison and Indoctrination Camps. Accessed at https://www.democracynow.org/2020/1/9/inside_chi
nas_push_to_turn_muslim.
43 01.KG. 2018.VBixkekproxlaakcipozawitepravtniqeskihkyrgyzovvKitae.
(Action to protect the rights of ethnic Kyrgyz in China was held in Bishkek). Accessed at https://
www.01.kg/news/2249574/v-biskeke-prosla-akcia-po-zasite-prav-etniceskih-kyrgyzov-v-kitae.
44 The Diplomat. 2021. Small Protests Persist Outside Chinese Consulate in Kazakhstan.
Accessed at https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/small-protests-persist-outside-chinese-consulate-in-
kazakhstan/.
45 Azattyk/nalgysy. 2017. “Kytalyk kyrgyzdar basym k\q
g
n\n atuuda.” (Radio
Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2017. Chinese Kyrgyz say that pressure has intensified) Accessed at
https://www.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan_china_ethnic_minority_rights_kyrgyz/28688593.html.
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citizenship before applying for Kyrgyz citizenship.46 Another young ethnic Kyrgyz
from China, a grandson of the Manas-epic-teller Jusup Mamai, who was a student
in a university in Bishkek, and a popular figure performing the Kyrgyz dance Kara
Jorgo on Kyrgyz TV programs and radios, was incarcerated in a re-education camp
after visiting China, on condition that his relative would be released. However, the
Kyrgyz government, as a deeply indebted country to China, had to ignore the Chinese
mistreatment of ethnic Kyrgyz, even if some of the detained also held Kyrgyz citi-
zenship. Similar cases were reported from Kazakhstan where two Chinese ethnic
Kazakhs faced litigation in Almaty in December 2019 for illegally crossing the
state border from China to Kazakhstan in pursuit of asylum and safety. Two months
earlier they had been informed by the Kazakh authorities that they will be deported
back to China despite applying for asylum.47 There is mutual agreement on deporta-
tion between the two governments, sending back those who illegally cross the state
borders, even without a public hearing. Another 43-year-old ethnic Kazakh woman
with her family, born in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture of the XUAR province
in China, entered Kazakhstan in the same illegal way. She had to apply for asylum in
Sweden with the assistance of the United States Embassy in Almaty and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees after her asylum application was rejected
by the Kazakh government.48
In brief, the Kazakh and the Kyrgyz governments preferred to not intervene in
Chinese domestic policies and instead decided to maintain bilateral agreements.
Nor do they pose any sanctions upon China for the detention without trial in re-
educational camps of ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz living in China’s North-Western
province. By this political practice, the governments violate OSCE norms and stan-
dards on minority and human rights. Kyrgyz ex-president Sooronbai Jeenbekov,
during the Annual Press Conference with journalists in 2018, stated that Kyrgyzstan
cannot intervene into the domestic affairs of China due to bi-lateral agreements.49 In a
similar way, the Kazakh government is afraid to openly comment on these issues and
to criticize Chinese mistreatment of ethnic minorities. At the same time, Kazakhstan
andKyrgyzstan are some of the largest recipients of Chinese infrastructural loans and
Foreign Direct Investment (Vakulchuk and Overland 2019), which increased since
2013. Financial dependency, among other, makes these countries vulnerable and
explains well why Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did not officially respond to Chinese
46 Ibid.
47 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “KNB: perexedxih granicu tniqeskih kazahov peredadut
obratno v Kita.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. KNB: ethnic Kazakhs who crossed
the border will be transferred back to China) Accessed at https://rus.azattyq.org/a/30311302.html.
48 Radio Azattyk. 2019. “Saragul Sauytba, ne poluqiv ubeiwa, pokinula
Kazahstan.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. Sairagul Sauytbai, not receiving asylum,
left Kazakhstan.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyq.org/a/kazakhstan-sayragul-sauytbay-pokinula-kaz
akhstan/29978459.html.
49 Radio Azattyk. 2018. “nbekov o kitaskih kyrgyzah: 	to gradane Kita,
my ne moem vmexivats.” (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. 2019. Jeenbekov on the
Chinese Kyrgyz: They are citizens of China, we cannot interfere.) Accessed at https://rus.azattyk.
org/a/29664421.html.
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mistreatment of ethnic minorities, even if that silence means that they violate and
disregard core principles on the protection of ethnic, linguistic, and religious minori-
ties. One can only speculate whether, if there were no infrastructural loans from
China, both countries would respond to Chinese domestic politics toward ethnic
minorities critically.
5.7 Conclusion
As illustrated by the cases of the Kyrgyz and Kazakh response to China’s detention
policies and infrastructural loans, China’s overall standing on minority issues and
non-transparent practices contradict the HCNM and ODIHR core principles. Conse-
quently, this dilemma undermines the OSCE’s integrity. The re-education camps
in Xinjiang region and the promotion of non-democratic practices, namely non-
transparent procurement, surveillance, and police equipment for suppression and
control of political dissidents in theOSCE region are examples of a breach ofOSCE’s
norms and values. This broadly means that countries indebted to China have to act
in accordance with Chinese interests and share China’s standing on governance and
the treatment of religious minorities.
Various sources define Chinese financing as foreign aid, investment and loans at
the same time, while China tends to avoid any definition on development or gover-
nance and prefers miscellaneous interpretations. For example, the meanings of “Chi-
nese way and characteristics” or “Chinese way of reaching harmony” are not always
clear to outsiders. However, what is clear is that Chinese foreign financing and the
BRI’s primary goal is largely aimed at the strengthening of its domestic economic
development, and overall to increase unemployment in China, not outside China,
as well as boosting its political influence in the international arena and overall in
Eurasia.
Like elsewhere, China is a leading loan-owner to many OSCEmember states, not
only to the less developed countries but also to countries that already receive large
sums of EU funding, such as Central and Eastern European countries. The presence
of China in the OSCE region became resilient after Beijing began providing infras-
tructural loans to those countries that are within the BRI realm. As demonstrated, the
size of the issued infrastructural loans in less developed economies are dispropor-
tionate to national economies, making debtor countries incapable of paying back the
loans. Financial dependence on China makes these countries vulnerable in terms of
OSCE’s norms and standards of fundamental freedom rights, good governance, and
rule of law and for this reason undermines the impact of OSCE programs to promote
democracy and human rights.
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